
CISA Critical Infrastructure Sector
Drone security for financial institutions
Data centers, cash operations and continuity sites carry a different exposure than a branch lobby. Aerial observation reveals layout, generator placement, cash-in-transit patterns and after-hours activity that a fence line was never built to hide. A Bank Protection Act security program is built around robbery and burglary, not the air domain.
Where The Exposure Is
Four things that make this sector different.

DATA CENTER PERIMETERS
Cooling systems, generator yards and access points are legible from above in a way a ground survey does not capture. A data center’s physical resilience plan rarely accounts for that view.
CASH OPERATIONS
Vaults, cash-in-transit staging and armored transport routes follow patterns that are easy to observe from the air over time and hard to observe from the street.
CONTINUITY SITES
Backup and disaster recovery facilities are often less staffed and less visibly secured than the headquarters they exist to protect. That asymmetry is a gap.
HEADQUARTERS AND BRANCH DENSITY
Urban headquarters and dense branch networks sit inside ordinary airspace traffic. An overflight that matters looks identical to one that does not.
Regulatory Context
The Bank Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 1882, implemented at 12 CFR 208.61, 12 CFR 326.3 to 326.4 and 12 CFR Part 21) requires banks to designate a security officer and maintain a written security program, with a report to the board at least annually. GLBA safeguards require physical access controls under 12 CFR Part 30, Appendix B for banks and 16 CFR 314.4 for non-banks. The FFIEC Business Continuity Management booklet expects a risk assessment and business impact analysis as part of an institution’s continuity program.
None of these require drone-specific defenses. A DVRA feeds directly into the obligations that already exist: its findings are written to support the security officer’s annual board report and the continuity risk assessment, not to sit beside them as separate paperwork.

How An Engagement Applies Here
The same four pillars, scoped to this environment.

Common questions
Has ClearPoint worked with organizations in this sector?
This page describes how our method applies to the environment, not a client list. ClearPoint does not publish client or engagement records.
What does an engagement here usually start with?
A DVRA. It establishes the baseline: what is actually flying over headquarters, data centers and continuity sites, and where existing procedure would break down under real pressure.
How does this fit our existing Bank Protection Act or GLBA security program?
It does not replace either. A DVRA is written to feed the security officer’s annual board report and the continuity risk assessment your institution already produces, adding the air domain as a documented input rather than a parallel exercise.
Do we need detection at every branch?
Almost certainly not. Coverage should follow exposure, and a headquarters campus, a data center and a suburban branch do not carry the same risk. An assessment run before procurement can narrow the equipment list rather than growing it.
Can you stop a drone over our facility?
No. In the United States, mitigating a drone is limited to federal agencies with statutory authority and, since July 2026, to state and local law enforcement and correctional agencies certified under the SAFER SKIES Act. ClearPoint does not mitigate. ClearPoint detects, tracks, assesses, documents, trains and coordinates with the agencies that hold that authority.

Start with the decision you need to make.
Whether you’re evaluating drone risk or ready to assess a specific site, we’ll help you identify the next step.

