CISA Critical Infrastructure Sector
Drone security for energy infrastructure
Generation plants, substations, pipelines and midstream facilities sit at the top of any list of sites surveilled from the air. The footprint is large, much of it unstaffed, and the equipment inside is both expensive to replace and legible from altitude.
Where The Exposure Is
Four things that make this sector different.
LARGE, LINEAR FOOTPRINT
Pipelines and transmission corridors run for miles through terrain that was never fenced against the air domain. A generation plant or substation is a fixed point, but the corridor connecting it to the grid is not.
UNSTAFFED CRITICAL NODES
Substations and compressor stations frequently run unattended for long stretches. An overflight there produces no witness and, without detection in place, no record.
HIGH-VALUE, LEGIBLE EQUIPMENT
Switchyard apparatus, control buildings and substation layouts are identifiable from directly overhead in a way that is not possible from a public road. Reconnaissance does not require a fence line to be crossed.
CONVERGING AIRSPACE USERS
Utility-operated inspection drones, recreational flyers near public land, and unauthorized activity can occupy the same airspace over the same asset. Distinguishing them is the job, not an afterthought.
Regulatory Context
Transmission owners and operators with stations at 500 kV and above, and qualifying stations between 200 and 499 kV, operate under NERC CIP-014-3 (Physical Security), enforceable under section 215 of the Federal Power Act. The standard requires a periodic risk assessment, on a 30 or 60 month cycle, verified by an unaffiliated third party, an evaluation of threats and vulnerabilities at each critical site, and a physical security plan to deter, detect, delay, assess, communicate and respond, also reviewed by a third party.
TSA’s Pipeline Security Guidelines for physical security are voluntary, and its mandatory security directives cover cybersecurity only. A DVRA is designed to feed the CIP-014 threat and vulnerability evaluation and its third-party review directly, documenting aerial surveillance and payload scenarios in terms the standard already expects. CIP-014 does not name drones specifically, and the assessment is written to support the existing requirement rather than invent a new one.
How An Engagement Applies Here
The same four pillars, scoped to this environment.
Common questions
Has ClearPoint worked with organizations in this sector?
This page describes how our method applies to the environment, not a client list. ClearPoint does not publish client or engagement records.
What does an engagement here usually start with?
A DVRA. It establishes the baseline: what is actually flying over the sites and corridors, what it can reach, and where detection or procedure breaks down. Every subsequent decision depends on it.
Can detection cover an entire pipeline or transmission corridor?
Coverage should follow exposure rather than mileage. An assessment identifies which segments and nodes carry the greatest consequence if compromised, so detection is placed where it changes the outcome, not spread evenly across a corridor that does not need it.
Do you work with existing plant security and operations teams?
Yes. An engagement is scoped around your existing security, operations and compliance functions rather than replacing them. The deliverables are written to be used by the people who already hold those responsibilities.
Can you stop a drone over our facility?
No. In the United States, mitigating a drone is limited to federal agencies with statutory authority and, since July 2026, to state and local law enforcement and correctional agencies certified under the SAFER SKIES Act. ClearPoint does not mitigate. ClearPoint detects, tracks, assesses, documents, trains and coordinates with the agencies that hold that authority.
Start with the decision you need to make.
Whether you’re evaluating drone risk or ready to assess a specific site, we’ll help you identify the next step.